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Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort

Liability-The Marriage Revisited
Greg Greenlee*
Ann M. Rochelle**
In a 1983 article in this Review, the authors predicted Wyoming's adoption of strict products liability. The prediction came
to pass in a March, 1986 decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
That decision, however, reserved the issue of strict liability
defenses for later determination. In their original article the
authors urged that comparativeprinciples,ratherthan the absolute
defenses of the comments to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts be applied in strict liability cases. In this update,
the authorspredict Wyoming's adoption of comparativeprinciples
for strict liability and find that the question is no longer whether
comparativeprinciples should apply, but instead, the extent and
nature of that application.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Within days and a few hundred feet of each other, Wyoming's
legislative, executive and judicial branches significantly altered Wyoming
law regarding strict liability and comparative fault. At the Wyoming State
Capitol on March 14, 1986, over his objection and without his signature,
Wyoming Governor Ed Herschler allowed a new comparative "negligence"
act to become law.' A block away at the Wyoming Supreme Court
Building, strict liability in the form of section 402A of the Restatement
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
*Partner, Murane & Bostwick, Casper, Wyoming. J.D. 1966, University of Wyoming;,
B.S. 1959, University of South Dakota.
**Associate, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, Wyoming. J.D. 1982; B.A. 1977,
University of Wyoming.
1. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986). While the
statute is entitled "Comparative Negligence," it is arguably a comparative fault act. See
infra text accompanying notes 83-95 (Section lII.A.).
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(Second)of Torts became the law of Wyoming when, on March 19, 1986,
the Wyoming Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.2
Wyoming has now joined what one author calls the "product liability
revolution. "I Wyoming goes well-armed into that revolution and enters
"well-charted territory on most strict liability issues that arise."4 One
"well-charted," although controversial, strict liability issue concerns the
effect of the plaintiff's conduct upon the strictly liable defendant's responsibility. Some thirty-four states now apply, to a greater or lesser degree,
comparative fault principles in strict products liability cases.' They allow
recovery which previously may have been barred by "all or nothing" contributory defenses but may reduce that recovery where the plaintiff's conduct caused the injuries.
This article supplements the authors' original article published in this
Review four years ago6 and updates developments from other jurisdictions regarding the application of comparative principles to strict liability. It assesses the Ogle decision's impact upon the course of Wyoming's
and evaluates Wyoming's revised comparative
strict liability law
"negligence" act. 7 It looks at recent Wyoming Supreme Court decisions
that are likely to affect Wyoming's development of strict liability law and
considers and recommends various courses of action which Wyoming
should consider.
II.

THE TREND CONTINUES

In our original article, we found that at least twenty states applied,
by judicial decision or by statute, in one form or another, to a greater or
lesser extent, comparative principles in strict liability actions Additionally, we reported that the comparative statutes of five other states were
not limited to actions based on negligence and that court decisions in two
2. 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986).
3. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 12.1, at 195 (2d. ed. 1986). Wyoming
comes late to the fray. In Ogle v. CaterpillarTractor Co., the Wyoming Supreme Court noted
that Wyoming was one of only five states which had not adopted strict liability. 716 P.2d
at 341 n.8. However, the Ogle court incorrectly named Utah as one of those states. Id (citing
2 L. FRUMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3-8 to -24 (1985)). To the contrary, Utah

adopted

RESTATEMENT ISECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel

Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).
4. Ogle, 716 P.2d at 341.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 11-62 (Section IT). The reader is cautioned regarding two aspects of this analysis. First, the statutes or judicial decisions discussed are
the latest pronouncements which our research has revealed. Thus they may not apply to
a particular case which, instead, may be governed by prior decisions or statutes. Second,
the nationwide wave of "tort reform" has resulted in numerous recent changes in product
liability and comparative negligence law. This trend is expected to continue, and the classification in this article of the various states will be affected accordingly.
6. Greenlee & Rochelle, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability-A Marriage of Necessity, XVIII LAND & WATER L. REV. 643 (1983) [hereinafter Greenlee & Rochelle
and referred to in the text as the "original article"].
7. See supra note 1.
8. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 654.
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others indicated probable application of comparative principles.9 Finally,
we reported that only seven jurisdictions appeared to reject the concept
of applying comparative principles to strict liability. 10 The trend in 1983
was definitely toward application of comparative principles in strict liability. In the four years since publication of the original article, the trend
has become a rout.
A. States Applying ComparativeNegligence Statutes to Strict Liability
Montana" has joined 12 Kansas, 3 New Jersey 14 and Wisconsin" in applying its comparative negligence statute to strict liability actions.
Mississippi was originally reported as a state applying its comparative
negligence statute to strict liability.16 Mississippi has been reclassified
under states whose comparative statutes are not limited to negligence. 7
B. States With ComparativeStrict Liability or ProductLiability Statutes
The original article reported"' that the comparative or product
liability statutes of seven states-Colorado, '" Connecticut,2' Idaho,"
9. Id at 656.
10. Id at 657.
11. Zharte v. Strum, Ruger & Co., Inc., 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983). In Zharte,
the Montana Supreme Court on a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, directed the application of MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1985)
(identical to 1983 version) to strict liability. Montana, however, severely limits the conduct
of the plaintiff which may be compared to the harm caused by the faulty product of the defendant, permitting comparison only if the plaintiff's conduct amounts to assumption of risk.
"If the defense is found to exist then plaintiff's conduct must be compared with that of defendant. The same Montana law which governs comparison of contributory negligence controls
comparison of assumption of risk." Id, 661 P.2d at 19; see also Fredenberg v. Superior Bus
Co., 631 F. Supp. 66 (D. Mont. 1986); Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co., 707 P.2d 2 (Mont. 1985).
Limiting conduct which may be considered by the trier of fact is criticized below. See infra
text accompanying notes 175-190 (Section V.D.).
12. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 654. See infra notes 13-15, for an update of
the three originally reported states which remain in this category.
13. Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-258a (1974)).
14. Hull v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 202 N.J. Super. 461, 495 A.2d 445 (1985) (applying
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1973)). Note that New Jersey, like Montana, limits the
plaintiff's conduct to be compared to assumption of risk. Id
15. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (applying WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (West 1971)), cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Collins, 469 U.S.
826 (1984).
16. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 654.
17. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
18. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 655. See infra notes 19-25, for an update of
the seven originally reported states whose statutes specifically provide that comparative
principles will apply to strict liability.
19. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (1985) provides for pure comparative fault "in any
product liability action." Unforeseeable misuse may be a complete defense. See Peterson
v. Parke Davis & Co., 705 P.2d 1001 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). Colorado's modified comparative
negligence statute is found at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1971).

20.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 52-572o (West Supp. 1987) provides pure "comparative

responsibility" for product liability actions. Connecticut's modified comparative negligence
statute is found at id. § 52-572h.
21. IDAHO CODE § 6-1404 (Supp. 1986) provides for modified "comparative responsibility"
for product liability actions. Idaho's modified comparative negligence statute is found at
id § 6-801 (1979).
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Michigan, 2 Minnesota," Nebraska2 and Washington 26-specifically
provided that comparative principles would apply to strict liability.
There are now eleven states with such statutes including, in addition to the original seven-Arizona,
Illinois,27 Iowa28 and
22. Micn. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2949(1) (West 1986) provides, "in all products liability
actions," for a reduction of damages "in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed
to the plaintiff"-in other words, pure comparative fault. Michigan's comparative history
is interesting in that its product liability statute was adopted in 1978, one year prior to the
judicial adoption of pure comparative negligence. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405
Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979). For an excellent discussion of the Michigan product liability statute, see Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 705 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1983).
23. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1987) is an all-inclusive modified contributory
fault scheme which includes negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, product misuse
and other causes of action.
24. NE. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1985) applies to "all actions brought to recover damages
for injuries to a person or to his property caused by the negligence or act or omission giving
rise to strict liability in tort" and provides that the plaintiff's recovery shall not be barred
when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence
or act or omission... of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff ....
The terms "slight" and "gross" do not appear well defined, but the scheme is clearly a modified
comparative plan, for surely a plaintiff whose "amount" of negligence is, say, "three-fourths"
(or "over half" or "more than the defendant's") could hardly be said to have been only "slightly" negligent.
25. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.005 to .925 (Supp. 1987) provides a pure comparative
fault system applicable to all causes of action including strict liability.
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2509.B (West Supp. 1986). This section is part of
Arizona's "Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," id §§ 12-2501 to -2509, which
is anything but uniform so far as it applies to comparative negligence. Sections 12-2505.A
to .C provide:
A. The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk is in all
cases a question of fact and shall at all times be left to the jury. If the jury
applies either defense, the claimant's action is not barred, but the full damages
shall be reduced in proportion to the relative degree of the claimant's fault which
is a proximate cause of the injury or death, if any. There is no right to comparative negligence in favor of any claimant who has intentionally, willfully
or wantonly caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death.
B. If an action involves claims for relief alleging both negligence and strict
liability in tort, and if Section 12- 2505 is applied with respect to the negligence
claims for relief, the reduction in damages under Section 12-2505 shall be applied to the damages awarded against all defendants, except that contributory
negligence, as distinguished from assumption of risk, is not a defense to a claim
alleging strict liability in tort, including any product liability action, as defined in Section 12-681, except claims alleging negligence.
C. For purposes of Section 12-2502, Section 12-2503, subsection F and Section 12-2505 with respect to cases involving assumption of risk, the relative
degree of fault of a person strict liable in tort is the defect causing injury to
the claimant. Among two or more persons strictly liable in tort who are entitled to claim contribution against each other, the relative degree of fault of
each is the degree to which each contributed to the defect causing injury to
the claimant.
I §§ 2501.A to .C. Thus Arizona compares the plaintiff's conduct to the fault of the strictly liable defendant only if that conduct amounts to more than mere negligence. Whether
assumption of risk is the only available defense is an open question.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2-1107.1, -1116 (1971). These statutes apply comparative
fault to all causes of action and permit comparison of all conduct or causative factors.
28. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1986). The Iowa statute broadly defines
fault to include negligence as well as acts or omissions "that subject a person to strict liabil-
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Utah.2 9 Some of these states-Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho and Michigan
-have comparative product liability statutes separate from their comparative negligence statutes. Others-Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota,
which speNebraska, Washington and Utah-have comparative statutes
30
cifically apply to both negligence and strict liability.
C. States with Statutes Not Limited to Negligence
The "undefined" comparative statute presents intriguing complexities. In the original article, 3' the comparative statutes3 of five states34
Arkansas, 32 Louisiana, Maine, 33 New York and Oregon -were found to
speak of "fault," "responsibility" or "culpable conduct" without defining those terms or indicating the causes of action to which they apply.
ity." Id. § 668.1. The statute further provides that the claimant may recover "unless the
claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of fault attributed
"Id §668.3.
to the defendants, third-party defendants and persons who have been released ....
29. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37, -38 (Supp. 1986). The Utah statute, although called
"comparative negligence," refers to fault and defines fault as including strict liability and,
even more specifically, product liability actions.
30. See statutes cited in Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 655, and those cited supra
notes 26-29.
31. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 656. See infra notes 32-35, for an update of
the four originally reported states remaining in this category which have undefined comparative statutes.
32. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979) provides for a modified comparison of
fault and defines "fault" as including "any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of
warranty or breach of any legal duty" but does not specifically include strict liability. kL
§ 27-1763. Because the statute does include breach of warranty and breach of any legal duty,
it is assumed that it will apply to strict liability although at this writing there are no decisions on point. Author, and now United States District Judge, Henry Woods certainly thinks
so: "Whether the action is brought in negligence, warranty, or strict liability, the conduct
is compared." H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT 435 (1978); see also Keltner v. Ford Motor
Co., 748 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1984).
33. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964) provides that where the plaintiff is partly
at fault his claim is not defeated unless his fault is equal to or greater than that of the defendant. Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984), construes the Maine
statute as applicable to strict liability actions but severely limits the conduct to be compared.
34. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1976) applies to "any action to recover
damages" and compares the "culpable conduct" of the plaintiff with the "culpable conduct"
which caused the damages, reducing plaintiff's damages on a pure comparative basis. The
statute applies to strict liability claims. See McLaughlin, PracticeCommentaries, 7B N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 385, 386 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987), which states: "By its terms,
Section 1411 is not limited to negligence actions. Thus, in an action for breach of warranty
[or] strict liability... CPLR 1411 now directs that the recovery be diminished by the proportion of the plaintiff's 'culpable conduct.' " See also Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co.,
Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983); Curry v. Moser, 89 A.D.2d
1, 454 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1982).
35. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1981) is a modified comparative fault statute, which provides that:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action ... to recover
damages ...if the fault attributable to the person seeking recovery was not
greater than the combined fault of the person or persons against whom recovery
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to
the percentage of fault attributable to the person recovering ....
The statute is applied to strict liability actions. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors,
292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Hackett v. Alco Standard Corp., 71 Or. App. 24, 691 P.2d
142 (1984), review denied; 298 Or. 822, 698 P.2d 963 (1985). However, the conduct to be compared is limited.
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Louisiana now judicially applies comparative principles in strict liability
and has rejected the direct application of its undefined comparative statute
to strict liability actions. Mississippi, originally catalogued as applying
its comparative negligence statute to strict liability, is now included in
this category since its comparative statute is not limited to negligence
actions.3 7 In 1986, New Hampshire adopted an undefined comparative
fault statute.3 Because of a federal court decision,"9 Rhode Island was
originally catalogued as rejecting the concept of applying comparative
principles to strict liability.4" The Rhode Island Supreme Court has now
spoken. That state now joins those whose undefined statutes are said to
apply to strict liability.41
The group of states with undefined comparative statutes may now
include Wyoming. Wyoming's revised comparative negligence statute,
though entitled "Comparative Negligence" provides that "contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery ... by any person ... to recover
damages for negligence ...if the contributory negligence is not more than
fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. ,,12
D. JudicialAdoption of Comparative Principles
In the original article, we noted that nine states (plus the Virgin
Islands) had judicially adopted comparative principles for strict liability.'3
These states were"4 Alaska," California,' 6 Florida, 7 Hawaii,"4 Montana,
36. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
37. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); see Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d
276 (5th Cir. 1975); Nichols v. Western Auto Supply Co., Inc., 477 So. 2d 261 (Miss. 1985).
38. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (West 1986).

39. Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 19781, cert. denied, 440 U.S.
916 (1979).
40. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 657.
41. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1985) provides:
Comparative negligence-In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries,
or where such injuries have resulted in death, of for injury to property, the
fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person having
control over the property may not have been in the exercise of due care shall

not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the finder of fact in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured, or
the owner of the property or the person having control over the property.

Rejecting the First Circuit's decision in Star Chopper, 584 F.2d 1124, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court stated, "After prolonged consideration and reading of this statute, we can
only come to the conclusion that the language 'all
actions hereafter brought for personal
injuries' includes actions brought on the theories of strict liability and breach of implied
warranty, as well as actions brought on negligence theory." Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d
719, 727 (R.I. 1983).
42. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes 83-95 (Section III).
43. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 655.
44. Id.

45. While Alaska still applies comparative principles to strict liability, it has substantially retreated from the sweeping language of Butaud v. Suburban Marine &Sporting Goods,
Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976), in which the Alaska Supreme Court held, "The comparative
negligence defense would be applied in the same manner as in any negligence case, with the
major difference being that in products liability cases it would not be necessary to prove
that a defect was caused by negligence." Id at 46. After vacillating for nearly a decade,
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Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas49 and Utah. Montana has now been reclassified as a state which, to a limited degree, has extended its com50
parative negligence statute to strict liability. Relying on a federal court
decision, 51 Nevada was originally classified as a state whose courts applied comparative principles to strict liability. Because of a recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court,5" Nevada has been reclassified as one
53
of only nine states rejecting the concept. Because of legislative action
in 1986, New Hampshire has a new undefined comparative fault statute'
and Utah has a new comparative statute applying to both negligence and
strict products liability.5

compareCaterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) with Sturm, Ruger &
Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), the Alaska Supreme Court reversed its broad
holding in Butaud and adopted, instead, the rule that the plaintiff's conduct, in order to
be compared in a strict liability action, must be more than a failure to exercise ordinary care.
Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985).
The Supreme Court of Alaska has confirmed its holding in Dura. In a footnote in Lamer
v. McKee Indus., Inc., 721 P.2d 611, 616 n.8 (Alaska 1986), the court stated that:
It should be emphasized that in a products liability case based on strict liability
in tort, comparative negligence is limited to the plaintiff's voluntary assumption of a known risk and that the plaintiff's mere failure to exercise ordinary
care is not enough to justify submitting the issues of comparative negligence
to the jury.
46. California adheres to its 1978 decision in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). Daly is acknowledged as the "landmark"
decision in the area of comparative negligence in strict liability. See Greenlee & Rochelle,
supra note 6, at 651, 653, 654, 661, 668 (discussingDaly). California originally adopted pure
comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1975).
47. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla 1976), holds that, in strict liability
cases, the user's contributory negligence, in the sense of failure to discover a defect, is not
a defense. However, unreasonable use of a product after discovery of a defect or failure of
the plaintiff to act as a reasonably prudent person are defenses which will be compared. I&
at 90. Florida had previously adopted pure comparative negligence in Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
48. Hawaii embraces California's decision in Daly and applies pure comparative principles to strict liability. Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343 (Haw. 1982). Hawaii's
comparative negligence statute, however, is of the modified variety. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31
(1976).
49. In a far-reaching and exhaustive decision, the Texas Supreme Court has held that
all products liability actions will be subject to the principle of "comparative causation." Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). Despite Texas' modified comparative
negligence statute, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 2212a (Vernon 1971) (recodified at TEx. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001 to .017 (Vernon 1986)), the court chose a pure comparative
system where "[t]he trier of fact is to compare the harm caused by the defective product
with the harm caused by the negligence of the other defendants, any settling tortfeasor and
the plaintiff." 665 S.W.2d at 427.
50. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
51. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 692 P.2d 24 (1984).
53. Id, 692 P.2d at 25; see infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (Section II.E.).
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Prior to adoption of the new statute,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395
A.2d 843 (1978), refused to apply New Hampshire's modified comparative negligence statute,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (West 1983), to strict liability but did apply modified comparative principles anyway. 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d at 850. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Seven additional states-Louisiana,58 New Mexico,57 North Dakota,5 8
Ohio,"9 Vermont,"0 West Virginia 1 and, arguably, Wyoming 0 -may now
be added to the seven remaining states whose state or federal courts have
judicially adopted comparative principles for strict liability actions.
56. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985). Rejecting the direct application
of Louisiana's pure comparative negligence statute, LA. CIv. CODE ANN. § 2323 (West Supp.
1987), the court held:
In those types of cases in which comparative fault principles may be applied,
the principles of article 2323 and its predecessors should be applied by analogy
so that the claim for damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to
the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the
injury, death or loss. Thus, the "pure" form of comparative negligence shall
apply in those strict products liability cases in which the plaintiff's award may
be reduced. Furthermore, the adoption of a system of comparative fault should,
where it applies, entail the merger of the defenses of misuse and assumption
of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault.
462 So. 2d at 172. Ordinary negligence, however, is not a defense. Id.
57. Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc., 102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985);
Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1983).
The Marchese court relied on Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (a non-products
liability case which adopted pure comparative negligence for New Mexico), to hold that pure
comparative fault, without restriction, would be applied in strict liability cases.
58. Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984). The Mauch
court held that:
When the defenses of assumption of risk and unforeseeable misuse are raised
in the context of a strict products-liability action, the trier of fact must determine, on a pure comparative causation basis, the percent of the injuries proximately caused by the assumption of risk or the unforeseeable misuse and the
percent proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous defect in the product, and the plaintiff's recovery must be reduced by an amount proportionate
to the damage caused by the misuse or assumption of risk.
Id at 348-49; see also Keller v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 360 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1984); Kaufman
v. Meditec, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 297 (N.D. 1984); Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d
349 (N.D. 1984). North Dakota has a modified comparative negligence statute. N.D. CENT.
CODE

§ 9-10-07 (1975).

59. Ohio law on this topic is in a state of flux. The authors believe, however, that the
Ohio Supreme Court will adopt comparative principles in strict liability actions. Two recent
but at this writing unpublished opinions from two intermediate Ohio Courts of Appeal both
adopt the concept. Additionally, Ohio has a modified comparative negligence statute, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Baldwin 1984). In Bowling v. Jake Sweeney Chevrolet, No.
CA84-05-054 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file), the Court of
Appeals for Butler County, Ohio, found "that comparative negligence is a factor for jury
consideration in strict liability cases concerning specifically the plaintiff's percentage of responsibility for causing the harmful event by his misconduct just as it would be under the comparative negligence statute." The Court of Appeals of Trumbull County, Ohio, in Onderko v.
Richmond Mfg. Co., No. 3474 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file),
concluded "that the doctrine of comparative fault applies to strict liability cases in Ohio, and
...that the negligence of all parties and assumption of risk shall be apportioned by the court
or jury in the same manner as the method provided in R.C. 2315.19." The Ohio federal courts,
however, disagree. See Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., Inc., 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985).
60. The Vermont Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the issue. Vermont has
enacted, however, a modified comparative negligence statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
(1973 & Supp. 1986). In a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, the United States District
Court for the District of Vermont considered the issue and held "that juries may consider
evidence of plaintiffs' negligence in assessing damages as to strict liability claims as well
as to negligence claims." Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Vt.
1985). The authors believe that when the issue is directly presented, the Vermont Supreme
Court will follow the federal court's lead.
61. West Virginia was the first and only state to judicially adopt modified comparative
negligence. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979). In
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E. States Rejecting Application of Comparative Principles
to Strict Liability
The original article reported that, in spite of their judicial or statutory
adoption of comparative negligence, only seven states-Georgia, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Rhode Island and West
Virginia-had rejected the concept of applying comparative principles in
strict liability actions.6 "
Some of those states that rejected the concept have changed since7
66
6
1983. While Georgia,14 Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and69South Dakota
68
have maintained their position, Ohio and Rhode Island now apply comparative principles to strict liability actions. Originally listed as a state
0
accepting the concept, Nevada has determined7 that comparative2 fault
strict liability. Massachusetts and
in
place
no
has
or causation
Missouri" were not classified in the original article, but should be included with those states that judicially reject the application of comparative
1982, the West Virginia Supreme Court extended this modified plan to strict liability claims.
Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982). In doing so, the
court held that the plaintiff's negligence must be something more than failing to discover
a defect or to guard against it. Id. at 861-62.
62. Sheldon v. Unit Rig & Equip. Co., 797 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 107
S. Ct. 1300 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 118-126 (Section IV.B.) and 163-174.
63. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 657.
64. See Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 235 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1973), on remand
136 Ga. App. 396, 221 S.E.2d 475 (1975).
65. See Saupitty v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1984); Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). Oklahoma's modified comparative
negligence statute is found at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13, 14 (West 1987).
66. See Bike v. American Motors Corp., 101 F.R.D. 77 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975); Danbacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.
Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984). Pennsylvania's modified comparative negligence statute is

found at 42 PA.

CONS. STAT. ANN.

§§ 7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1986), 8324 (Purdon 1982).

Pennsylvania may be moving toward adoption of comparative principles for strict liability.
See Dambacher, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d at 430 (Wieand, J., dissenting).
67. Confirming its holding in Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979), the South
Dakota Supreme Court held that strict liability and comparative principles are incompatible. Klug v. Keller Indus., Inc, 328 N.W.2d 847 (S.D. 1982). South Dakota's comparative

negligence statute, S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 20-9-2 (1979), provides for a comparison of

the plaintiff's negligence to that of the defendant but only if the plaintiff's negligence is
"slight in comparison." See supra note 24 (concerning the Nebraska comparative negligence
statute, on which the South Dakota law was based).
68. See supra note 59.
69. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
70. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 665.
71. See supra note 53.
72. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983);
Hallmark Color Labs, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 20 Mass. App. 909, 477 N.E.2d 1052 (1985).
Massachusetts does not have strict products liability as such, Swartz v. General Motors
Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978), but applies breach of warranty without the requirement of privity to achieve the same result, Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 378
N.E.2d 964 (1978).
73. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986). Although the Missouri

Supreme Court embraced the

UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT,

12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1983),

when adopting pure comparative fault for negligence cases, Gustfason v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d
11 (Mo. 1983), the Lippard decision rejects the application of comparative principles of any
sort in a strict liability context.
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principles in strict liability actions. Two states, Indiana" and Kentucky, 75
have adopted product liability statutes which reject comparative defenses
in strict products liability actions.
M

F. States Without Comparative Negligence
Finally, there are six states which have not yet adopted, or have
specifically rejected, comparative principles in any context. These states
are Alabama,76 Maryland,17 North Carolina,"8 South Carolina, 79 Tennesseell
8
and Virginia. '
G. Summary of the States
With the exception of Delaware,82 this update classifies each state with
respect to statutory and judicial action concerning comparative negligence
and the application of comparative principles to strict liability actions.
Of the remaining forty-nine states, six have not adopted comparative principles even for negligence actions. Only nine states reject application of
comparative principles in strict liability. This leaves thirty-four states
which have applied comparative principles or whose statutes permit such
application. While the argument that comparative principles and strict
liability are incompatible concepts still enjoys some life, it is slowing dy74. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-20A-1 to -5 (Burns 1986) define four absolute defenses
to
a strict liability action: assumption of risk, product misuse, modification or alteration,
and
conformity with the state of the art. Conduct of the plaintiff not described in the
statute
is not a defense, comparative or absolute. Indiana's comparative fault act, which was amended
to specifically exclude strict liability and warranty, is found at id. §§ 34-4-33-2 to
-13.
75. Kentucky has a unique "Products Liability Act" providing that a manufacturer
is liable "only if the product was used in its original, unaltered and unmodified condition"
or for "alterations or modifications made ... in accordance with specifications or
instructions furnished by the manufacturer." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.320 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1986). The act also provides:
(2) In any product liability action, if the plaintiff performed an unauthorized
alteration or an unauthorized modification .... the defendant shallnot be liable
whether or not said defendant was at fault or the product was defective.
(3) In any product liability action, if the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary
care in the circumstances in his use of the product .... the defendant shall
not be liable whether or not said defendant was at fault or the product was
defective.
Id. §§ 411.320(2), -(3) (emphasis added).
Kentucky judicially adopted pure comparative negligence for negligence cases in Hilen
v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984). Although dicta in Hilen suggested that, despite
the
clear language of the statute, the defenses might be applied on a comparative basis,
a 1986
decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court now holds that the defenses are absolute.
Redo
Pump Co. v. Finck, 713 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1986).
76. See Golden v. McMurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980); Atkins v. American Motors
Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 143 (Ala. 1976).
77. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442,456 A.2d 894 (1983).
78. See Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1980).
79. See Langley v. Boyter, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1985).
80. See Kennedy v. Perry, 688 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
81. See Gardner v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 225 Va. 599, 303 S.E.2d 914, 916-17
(1983).
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1986) established modified comparative
negligence in Delaware. There has been no decision, however, as to the applicability
of comparative principles in strict liability actions.
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ing away. The question of far greater vitality today is how, and the extent to which, a strictly liable defendant will be affected by the negligent
conduct of the plaintiff.
Appended to this article is a table of all states setting forth the
statutory and judicial action in each state concerning these matters.
III.

WYOMING'S REVISED COMPARATIVE "NEGLIGENCE"

ACT

In 1986, the Wyoming State Legislature modified Wyoming's comparative negligence statute.83 The 1986 comparative negligence act
changed Wyoming law in four major ways. First, the language of the new
statute now arguably compares all fault, not just the negligence of the
parties; second, it eliminated joint and several liability; third, it changed
Wyoming's scheme of comparative fault under which each tortfeasor's
fault was individuallycompared to that of the plaintiff, to a system under
which plaintiff's responsibility is compared to that of all tortfeasors; and
fourth, it eliminated statutory contribution. A discussion of each of these
points will be made in turn.
A. Comparative Fault Principles Under The New Act
While the title of the statute is "Comparative Negligence," the text
of the new statute is not limited to the comparison of the parties'
"negligence." It compares "fault."'"1 New section 1-1-109 of the Wyoming
Statutes states:
(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if the contributory negligence of the said person is not more than
fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall
be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed
to the person recovering.
83. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986) The act applies to all causes of actions accruing after its effective date. The act is effective June 11, 1986. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.
24, §§ 2, 3. Causes of action accruing prior to June 11, 1986, are governed by Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977). Wyoming's prior comparative negligence statute can arguably be applied to strict liability actions. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 657-59, discussed the
means by which Wyoming's 1973 comparative negligence statute could be applied to strict
liability. See also infra text accompanying notes 143-156 (Section V.1.).
84. The statute is arguably a comparative "fault" act. Maine's Supreme Court had no
problem construing its incorrectly captioned statute to be a comparative fault scheme. In
Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 282 n.3 (Me. 1984), it stated, "Although
section 156 is loosely referred to as Maine's 'comparative negligence statute,' it in specific
terms requires a comparison of fault ...."
Ogle appeared to equate "fault" with negligence or a failure to exercise due care. Ogle
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986). While some jurisdictions speak
of strict liability as liability without fault, the majority, and better, rule is that strict liability, although not a negligence theory, is premised upon fault concepts. See Greenlee & Rochelle,
supra note 6, at 656 n.74. The authors believe that the use of the term "fault" in Ogle to
distinguish strict liability from negligence actions was merely a means of making a point,
and not a determination that strict liability is absolute liability or liability without fault.
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(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial:
(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party; and
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination
of the percentage of fault.
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, determining the total amount of damages and the
percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a
party.
(c) The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined
under subsection (b) of this section in proportion to the amount
of fault attributed to the person recovering and enter judgment
against each defendant in the amount determined under subsection (d) of this section.
(d) Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total
dollar amount determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or
(i) of this section in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section."
Comparing the 1973 statute to the 1986 law, many references to
"negligence" in the 1973 law have been replaced
by the term "fault" in
the new law. 86 The new comparative act originated as Senate File No. 17.87
85. WYo. STAT. ANN. 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986).
86. Compare id. § 1-1-109 (1977) with id § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986). The 1973 law made
no references to "fault" and made eight references to "negligence." By comparison,
the 1986
law mentions "fault" six times and only mentions "negligence" four times, all but one of
which refers to the conduct of the claimant. Old section 1-1-109 stated:
(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.
Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributed to the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts.
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact,
determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. The court shall then reduce the amount of such
damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person
recovering;

(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of negligence.

Id. § 1-1-109 (1977).

87. Senate File No. 17, 48th Legis., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 1986) (Legislative Serv. Office
No. 86L50-0122.01), as originally introduced, read in pertinent part as follows:

Be It enacted by the Legislature of the State of Wyoming:

Section 1. W.S. 1-1-109 is amended to read:

1-1-109. Comparative negligence.

(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property. ;-if--he-eefttibutey-itegltgene-wos
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By the time the 1986 law was passed, most references in Senate File No.
17 to the comparison of the defendant's "negligence" had been changed
to the defendant's "fault."" 8
The preamble to the final version of section 1-1-109 also referenced
comparison of "fault" by noting "that a plaintiff in a negligence action
is entitled to a proportionate recovery of his damages if the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total
fault ..... The preamble further provides "that each defendant is liable
only to the extent of his percentage of fault as compared to all other actors whether or not parties to the action ... .
Based upon this legislative history, "fault" obviously means something more than "negligence." The authors suggest that "fault" in the
statute has or should have the same meaning as "fault" in the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, which includes strict liability and breach of warranty, as well as negligence, within that term. °
It could, however, be argued that the new statute is limited to a comparison of the "negligence" of the parties. The title is "Comparative
Negligence; "91 the preamble says that the act applies to "a plaintiff in
notes-geates-"itegtigeneef-these
Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributed to the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial: ;
(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts DETERMINING THE
TOTAL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH ACTOR WHETHER OR NOT
A PARTY; AND
(B) INFORM THE JURY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DETERMINATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF NEGLIGENCE.
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact,
determining the TOTAL amount of damages and the percentage of negligence
attributable to each ACTOR WHETHER OR NOT A party.
(c) The court shall then reduce the amount of smeh damages DETERMINED
UNDER (b) OF THIS SUBSECTION in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the person recovering; AND ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST
EACH DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT DETERMINED UNDER SUBSECTION (d) OF THIS SECTION.
l
.- ef-tl- eonsequenees-of-its-&-oi-t h -pereeftege-of- egligenee.
(d) EACH DEFENDANT IS LIABLE ONLY FOR THAT PROPORTION
OF THE TOTAL DOLLAR AMOUNT DETERMINED AS DAMAGES
UNDER PARAGRAPH (b)(i) OR (ii) OF THIS SECTION IN THE RATIO
OF THE AMOUNT OF FAULT ATTRIBUTED TO HIM UNDER PARAGRAPH (b)(i) OR (ii) OF THIS SECTION.
88. Compare Senate File No. 17, supra note 87 with WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Supp.
1986). Not including the preamble or the title, original Senate File No. 17 contained only
one reference to "fault," while the 1986 law as enacted contains six such references. The
original Senate File No. 17 contained seven "negligence" references, while the 1986 law has
only four references to "negligence," all but one of which refers to the conduct of the claimant.
89. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24 (emphasis added). Although the preamble to a statute
is not binding, the Wyoming Supreme Court does consider it in construing statutes. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 275 n.3 (Wyo. 1977).
90. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1983).
91. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986). See Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
471 A.2d 280, 282 (Me. 1984). In Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983), the Supreme
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a negligence action;" and the first sentence of the statute provides that
"Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action ...for
negligence. ..."92 However, rules of statutory construction require that
"all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause
and sentence of it must be considered so that no part will be inoperative
or superfluous." 9' 3 Further, courts "must assume that the legislature did
not intend futile things."9 ' Unless "fault" is limited to negligence, to say
this statute is a comparative negligence statute, allowing only the comparison of negligence would be to ignore the many references to fault in
the statute as well as the statute's clear directive requiring the jury to
95
determine the percentage of the fault of each actor.
B. Elimination of Joint and Several Liability
A major impetus for the 1986 change was a challenge by the Judiciary
98
to the Legislature to redress the inequities of joint and several liability.
97
Kirby Building Systems v. Mineral Explorations summarized the joint
and several liability doctrine in the 1973 law by saying:
If there are defendants whose fault exceeds that of the plaintiff,
the plaintiff may proceed against any or all of such tortfeasors
jointly or severally for the full amount of the judgment, and, contrary to the position of the appellant Kirby, no other reduction
Court of Rhode Island refused to use the title to the statute to assist in its construction
of the statute. The title to the statute seemed to limit its application to negligence cases.
The clear language of the statute showed its application to be broader than just negligence
cases and the court held it applied to "all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries."
Id.at 727.
92. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(a) (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in the case of Sheldon v. Unit Rig & Equipment Co., 797
F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986), refused to extend the 1973 comparative negligence statute to a
products liability case based upon breach of warranty, saying, "The Wyoming Comparative
Negligence Statute on its face does not resolve the warranty claim issue. The statute refers
to an action 'to recover damages for negligence.' The statute does not refer explicitly to actions sounding in warranty or in strict liability." I& at 886; see infra notes 117-125 and accompanying text (Section IV.B.).
93. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wyo. 1985).
94. Id.; see also State Bd. of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil, 694 P.2d 97, 99 (Wyo. 1985).
95. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109{b)(ii) (Supp. 1986).
96. In Kirby Bldg. Systems v. MineralExplorationsCo., Justice Brown's specially concurring opinion states:

Rather than overrule our earlier cases and reverse, I would opt to affirm this
case and urge the legislature to reexamine our statutes and by appropriate
legislation cure the inequities pointed out by Justice Rooney.
Under our statutory scheme, Section 1-1-109, W.S. 1977 (comparative
negligence), and Sections 1-1-110 through 1-1-113, W.S. 1977 (right to contribution among joint tortfeasors), a defendant with only slight fault could be required to pay the entire judgment (in the event the defendant who was principally at fault was insolvent). Also under our statutory scheme, a defendant
who is principally at fault could settle for a token amount before trial and thus
shift the remaining burden of a large judgment on a defendant whose fault
is slight. (See examples set out by Justice Rooney in his dissent.)
I am not convinced the legislature intended the apparent inequity that
I have pointed out. Our statutory scheme helps redistribute the wealth but
I am not persuaded it is free from constitutional infirmities.
704 P.2d 1266, 1277-78 (Wyo. 1985) (Brown, J., specially concurring) (parentheses in original).
97. Id
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may be made from the verdict figure which reduction is based upon
the fault of a tortfeasor 5
The final bill became law with sharp criticism by Governor Herschler.
The Governor refused to sign the bill, saying that it was not likely to cure
the evils of joint and several liability. 9"
Under the new law, judgment is entered against each defendant in
the amount proportional to his fault, not for the entire amount of the damages as under prior law. 00 Gone is the concept of joint liability for the
indivisible whole of the damages. 0'
C. Changes in Wyoming's "Modified" Scheme
With the 1973 law, Wyoming had a "modified" comparative scheme
under which a plaintiff could recover only if his negligence was less than
the negligence of each of the defendants compared individually.'0"As an
example, this meant that a plaintiff who was ten percent responsible could
not recover from a five percent responsible defendant. That plaintiff could,
however, recover from either a fifteen percent liable defendant or a seventy
percent liable defendant. Plaintiff's recovery, of course, was diminished
by plaintiff's percentage of negligence.
Under the 1986 act, the fault of the plaintiff is compared to the total
fault of all tortfeasors. While a plaintiff may recover if his fault exceeds
a particular defendant's fault, he will not recover if his fault is more than
fifty percent of the total. His recovery will diminish by his percentage
of fault as long as his fault is fifty percent or less. 102 Under the prior example, the ten percent liable plaintiff can recover from the five percent
liable defendant. However, under the new law, no defendant is liable for
damages beyond his percentage share.
98. Id. at 1273.
99. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24; see also Herschler lets what he calls 'horrible' bill
become law, Casper (Wyo.) Star-Tribune, Mar. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 5, which states:
Gov. Ed Herschler allowed a bill repealing the doctrine of joint and severability [sic] to become law without his signature Friday, despite his belief that it
is a "horrible piece of legislation."
The new law, which substitutes a modified form of comparative negligence
for the joint and several liability doctrine, is a critical part of the Joint Judiciary
Committee's package to help solve the liability-insurance crisis.
The bill also was recommended by a majority of the members of a special
insurance committee appointed by Herschler.
"I'm glad the governor has followed the advice of his own select committee on insurance," said one committee member, House Speaker Jack Sidi,
R-Natrona.
100. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(d) (Supp. 1986) ("Each defendant is liable only for that
proportion of the dollar amount determined as damages ...in the percentage of fault attributed to him.").
101. Under the old law, plaintiff could look to any defendant whose fault exceeded that
of plaintiff. Id. § 1-1-109 (1977).
102. Id. § 1-1-109(a) (1977); Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1186
(Wyo.), reh'g denied 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981).
103. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(a) (Supp. 1986).
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Wyoming's scheme under the 1986 law is still a "modified" approach.
10 4
Plaintiff cannot recover if he is more than fifty percent at fault.
D. Elimination of the Contribution Statutes
When the Wyoming Legislature eliminated the doctrine of joint and
several liability, it eliminated the statutes regarding contribution." 5
Because a less than 100% at fault defendant is no longer liable to the plaintiff for the entire amount of the judgment, as he was under the joint and
several liability doctrine, there should be no need for the doctrine of contribution.'

IV.

RECENT WYOMING CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS

A. Ogle v. CaterpillarTractor Co.
The Wyoming Supreme Court decision in Ogle v. CaterpillarTractor
Co.' 7 is noteworthy in several respects. It adopts for Wyoming the tort
of strict liability. It clearly explains the philosophy and reasons for the
adoption. It defines, and to the extent the court was able under the facts
before it, explains how strict liability is to be construed and applied. It
virtually eliminates the need to rely upon the warranty provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code in any but a commercial action. It provides
guidelines for pleading the tort. It makes clear which statute of limitations will apply. It does not, however, provide any definitive guidelines
as to how to handle negligent conduct of the plaintiff.
Ogle eagerly embraced the doctrine of strict liability:
Today we join the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions and hold that strict liability in tort is a valid cause of action
in Wyoming. It is truly an independent cause of action that can
104. The differences between the 1973 and 1986 laws are evident upon comparing the
recoveries under each law using a hypothetical $100,000 jury verdict. Assume a ten percent
responsible plaintiff, a five percent responsible defendant, a fifteen percent responsible defendant, and a seventy percent responsible defendant. These results obtain:
1986 Law
1973 Law
Reduce recovery by $10,000.
Reduce recovery by $10,000.
P
(10%)
Responsible for $5,000.
No liability.
D1 ( 5%)
Responsible for $15,000.
Responsible (potentially) for $90,000.
D2 (15%)
Responsible for $70,000.
Responsible (potentially) for $90,000.
D3 (70%)
Totals under 1973 Law. Plaintiff can recover $90,000 from either D2 or D3. If D2 pays
the entire $90,000, he can look to D3 for contribution according to D3's percentage of liability.
If D3 is unable to pay, then D2 is "stuck" shouldering the responsibility for the entire
judgment.
Totals under 1986 Law. Plaintiff can recover $90,000. To do so however, plaintiff must
look to each of the defendants for payment of each defendant's proportionate share of fault.
If one defendant is unable to pay, plaintiff may not look to the other defendants for the
defaulting defendant's share.
105. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (1977) were repealed. See 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws
ch. 30, § 2.
106. While the Supreme Court of Wyoming has not yet considered the issue, the argument has been made that, since the act repealed the contribution statutes as of June 11,
1986, there is no contribution available, even for those cases in which joint and several liability
applies. A discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this article.
107. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 {Wyo. 1986).
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be successfully pled and proven without regard to a manufacturer's or seller's negligence and without regard to the UCC's
restrictions on breach of warranty actions.' 8
Recognizing that different states define strict liability in various ways,
the court specifically adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts,109 noting that:
[W]e believe that the restatement definition forms the best starting place from which the cause of action can evolve in Wyoming.
The definition is reasonably complete and will allow the district
courts and Wyoming lawyers to litigate these cases with some
measure of confidence. In addition, many of the finer points that
are not explicitly covered in Section 402A or its official comments
have been considered and resolved elsewhere."'
Ogle was faced with the specific question of whether material alteration is a defense to strict liability in Wyoming. Ogle answered affirmatively."' In so recognizing this defense, Ogle demonstrated that "strict" liability does not mean "absolute" liability. At minimum, material alteration
is a defense." 2
Other defenses available to a defendant in a strict liability action in
Wyoming are not clear. If Wyoming adheres to the literal language of the
Restatement and its comments in defining what defenses apply, then the
108. Id at 341.
109. Id at 341-42. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
110. Ogle, 716 P.2d at 341. Under Ogle a plaintiff seeking recovery under strict liability must prove five elements:
(1) That the sellers were engaged in the business of selling the product that
caused the harm;
(2) that the product was defective when sold;
(3) that the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer;
(4) that the product was intended to and did reach the consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was sold; and
(5) that the product caused physical harm to the plaintiff/consumer.
Id at 344.
111. Id at 345.
112. Actually, proof of material alteration, or lack thereof is the burden of both the plaintiff
and the defendant. The plaintiff must show that the product reached him in substantially
the same condition as it was when sold. RESTATEMENT § 402A(1)(b); supra note 109 (quoting
§ 402A) & 110 (element number four). Once having done so, however, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove that the product had been materially altered. Ogle, 716 P.2d at 346.
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only defenses will be assumption of risk,"' misuse'1 and material alteration." 5 Further, these defenses would operate as complete bars to plaintiff's recovery. There is language in Ogle which supports the contention
that the defense of material alteration is a complete bar. The Ogle court
said that "the seller may not be liable for a plaintiff's injuries which are
caused by unforeseeable alterations in the product rather than the original
defects." ' ' The Ogle court notes that negligence and warranty actions
raise the defense of alteration "under the rubric of intervening or superseding cause" which would make the alteration a complete bar."'
B. Sheldon v. Unit Rig & Equipment Co.
In Sheldon,1 the Tenth Circuit refused to apply Wyoming's 1973 comparative negligence statute' 9 to a warranty action saying that the statute
was limited by its terms to negligence actions. 20 Sheldon, however, went
on to say that apart from the 1973 statute, "a plaintiff's contributory
negligence is entitled to some consideration in a breach of warranty action, even though such negligence may not preclude recovery ....
"1211
The
Sheldon court concluded by saying that plaintiff's recovery in a warranty action is reduced by plaintiff's percentage of fault:
Based on the existing precedent in Wyoming and the silence of
statutory law on the issue, we conclude that appellant's contrib113.

RESTATEMENT

§ 402A, comment n, at 356 (emphasis added), states, "If the user

or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds

unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."
In Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979), the Wyoming Supreme Court indicated that
assumption of risk is but a species of contributory negligence or contributory fault and
therefore is not a complete bar.
114. RESTATEMENT §402A, comment h, at 351 (emphasis added), states, "If the injury
results from abnormal handling .... the seller is not liable."

115. Id. § 402A(l)(b); Ogle, 716 P.2d at 345.
116. Ogle,716 P.2d at 345 (emphasis added). Schwartz recognized two varieties of misuse
and stated that they should carry two different consequences. One should be a complete
defense and one should result ina reduction to a plaintiff's claim:
Unintended Unforeseeable Misuse
It is suggested that plaintiff's unintended unforeseeable misuse of a product should constitute a complete defense and comparative negligence should
have no bearing. Defendant has violated no duty to plaintiff and, therefore,
should pay no penalty.
Unintended Foreseeable Misuse
On the other hand, when plaintiff makes an unintended but reasonably
anticipated or truly foreseeable misuse of a product that is defective as to that
use, his claim should be reduced by the amount he is at fault.
V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 214. Courts have failed to maintain the distinction
between the two concepts of misuse. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 646-48.
117. Ogle, 716 P.2d at 345.
118. 797 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1300 (1987).
119. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
120. Sheldon, 797 F.2d at 886. In Greenlee &Rochelle, supra note 6, at 664-65, we stated
that the language of the 1973 act did not preclude application of the statute to strict products liability. For the various reasons advanced in our prior article, the authors disagree
with the Sheldon court's conclusion regarding the non-applicability of the statute to strict
liability or warranty.
121. Sheldon, 797 F.2d at 887.
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utory negligence did not bar recovery completely under a warranty
theory. The jury assessed appellant's damages at $540,000. Applying the relevant case law of Wyoming, we hold that it is appropriate to reduce appellant's damages by the percentage of his
contributing fault .... 122
Sheldon specifically refused to say if new section 1-1-109 would alter the
court's conclusion. As the new law did not become effective until June
prior to that date, the new
11, 1986 and the Sheldon cause of action1 arose
23
statute did not affect the instant case.
Sheldon takes a very literal interpretation of Wyoming's 1973 comparative negligence statute. Since the decision cites strict liability cases
from other jurisdictions as authority, it apparently overlooked Wisconsin's application of its comparative negligence statute to strict liability
claims. 24 Wisconsin is important because it is the state of origin of Wyoming's 1973 comparative negligence act.'25 Sheldon also failed to deal with
the sound policy reasons which have been advanced for applying the same
comparative scheme in a warranty or strict liability action as in a
negligence action. 21 Wyoming has a "modified" scheme under its 1973
comparative negligence statute and, because of Sheldon, now has a "pure"
scheme under warranty and, arguably, strict liability actions, at least in
the federal courts.
The Sheldon court must, however, be given credit for its willingness
to recognize comparative negligence as a defense to a warranty claim and
because it did not limit the types of plaintiff's conduct which could be
compared. Its reasoning and methodology, however, create inconsistency and practical problems for courts and juries in cases involving multiple theories or parties.
C. Other Decisions
Three additional products liability cases, decided since publication of
the original article, will be of interest to Wyoming lawyers involved in
products cases. These cases are CaterpillarTractorCo. v. Donahue,'27 Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing Co.,'2 8 and O'Donnell v. City of
Casper." 9 While none of these decisions directly involved strict products
122. Id. at 887-88. The plaintiff in Sheldon was found to be more negligent than either
of the other two actors. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 886 n.2.
124. Id. at 887 n.3; see Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
125. Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 845 (Wyo. 1977).
126. In Sheldon, the court applied "pure" comparative principles of fault, as opposed
to the "modified" scheme of comparative negligence in the statute. These authors disagree
with this holding. If the scheme for negligence is "pure" then the scheme for strict liability
should be "pure." If the negligence scheme is "modified," then the strict liability scheme
should be "modified." See Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 666; infra text accompanying notes 157-174 (Section V.C.).
127. 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1984).
128. 675 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1984).
129. 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985).
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liability, the decisions are valuable for their discussions of various products liability issues, including expert testimony, the seller's duties and
industry custom.

V.

ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVES

A. The Decision to Adopt Comparative Fault for Strict Liability
One alternative as to what to do with the plaintiff's conduct, of course,
is to reject the concept that comparative fault principles should apply in
strict liability actions. In doing just that, one justice of the South Dakota
Supreme Court noted:
There is definitely a trend in the United States to compare
negligence on (sic] strict products liability actions. [Citing cases.]
However, this creates two great difficulties:
(1) how do you compare the negligence of one party with the strict
liability of the other; and
(2) the plaintiff's misconduct: how may it be used as a basis for
reducing the plaintiff's
recovery under the principles of com130
parative negligence?
The authors suggest that courts which have refused to apply comparative principles in strict liability, on the basis that the theories are
abhorrent, are unnecessarily embroiled in semantics. The comparison is
not of the plaintiff's "negligence" with the product seller's "strict liability." It is, instead, a ranking by the fact finder of those factors which
combined to cause the accident, be they substandard conduct or a product defect. If jurors can assign percentages of fault in a case of a speeding
driver who collides with a jaywalking pedestrian, there is no reason why
they should not complete the analysis by determining the percentage of
fault to be assigned to the manufacturer of the vehicle's defective brakes.
As Professor Schwartz notes, any perceived obstacle in making the comparison in a strict liability action is "more conceptual than practical. Juries
have shown that they are capable, when the plaintiff has been objectively at fault, of taking into account how much bearing that fault had on
the amount of damage suffered and of adjusting and reducing the award
accordingly. ,,131
As is stated elsewhere in this article,' the Wyoming Supreme Court
in Ogle made specific reference to the official comments to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second)of Torts'3 but did not quote or rely on them
in the course of the opinion. The court further noted that "many of the
finer points [of strict liability] have been considered and resolved
130. Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 162 (S.D. 1979) (Henderson, J., concurring). The
South Dakota Supreme Court has refused to overrule Smith. See Klug v. Keller Indus., Inc..
328 N.W.2d 847 (S.D. 1982); see also supra note 67 (discussing Klug).
131. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 215.
132. See supra text accompanying note 110.
133. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986).
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elsewhere."' 34 This language presents several problems. First, two of the
Restatement comments, (h) and (n), reject simple contributory negligence
as a defense and establish misuse and assumption of risk as absolute
defenses.'3 ' Second, the Wyoming Supreme Court has for many years
refused to recognize assumption of risk as a separate defense.' 6 Third,
as is clear from Section II of this article, the vast majority of courts which
have considered the issue have resolved the "finer points" of what to do
with the plaintiff's conduct by adopting some form of comparative fault
for strict liability. So should Wyoming.
The Restatement comments concerning defenses based upon the plaintiff's conduct were developed and adopted in the mid-1960s. In that era,
comparative negligence theory was in its embryonic state.' 37 As was
pointed out in the original article, the Restatement's restriction of defenses
to misuse and assumption of risk was the Restatement's response to the
then absolute defense of contributory negligence.' 3 8 With the advent of
comparative negligence, which now prevails in all but six states,'31 9 absolute
defenses (except in the context of superseding cause) should cease to exist. Absolute defenses unfairly punish the plaintiff who is only partially
at fault, while allowing a more culpable defendant to escape liability. The
determination of relative responsibility for causing injury should be left
to the fact finder.
Now that strict liability has been adopted by Wyoming,'40 the question of whether and to what extent the plaintiff's conduct will affect his
recovery must soon be resolved.'' Wyoming should follow the vast majority of comparative negligence states which apply comparative principles, since:
[T]he expressed purposes which persuaded us in the first instance
to adopt strict liability... would not be thwarted were we to apply comparative principles. What would be forfeit is a degree of
semantic symmetry. However, in this evolving area of tort law
in which new remedies are judicially created, and old defenses
judicially merged, impelled by strong considerations of equity and
134. Id
135. See Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 647-48; infra text accompanying notes
178-180.
136. Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979) ("[Assumption of risk, as a form
of contributory negligence, is not an absolute defense to a negligence action, but is a basis
for apportionment of fault.").
137. In 1965, the year that the RESTATEMENT § 402A was published, only seven states
had adopted comparative negligence. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 1. Today those
proportions have been reversed, with only six states remaining which have not adopted some
form of comparative negligence. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
138. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 648.
139. See infra Appendix (Table of States).
140. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986).
141. The question has already arisen. See Sheldon v. Unit Rig & Equipment Co., 797
F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1300 (1987; see also supra notes 118-126
and accompanying text (Section IV.B.). Additionally, the authors and other Wyoming practitioners report that strict liability cases which have been settled or which are still pending
have considered the question.
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fairness we seek a larger synthesis. If a more just result follows
from the expansion of comparative principles, we have no hesitancy in seeking it, mindful always that the fundamental and underlying purpose of [comparative negligence] was to promote the equitable allocation of loss among all parties legally responsible in proportion to their fault."'
B. Statutory or JudicialApplication?
Once there is a determination to adopt comparative fault for strict
liability, a decision must be made as to how Wyoming is to achieve that
result. There are two alternatives: to extend the comparative negligence
statute to strict liability or, alternatively, to judicially adopt comparative
principles for strict liability. If the decision is judicial adoption, then there
is a sub-issue-should the judicially adopted scheme, like the statute, be
a modified comparative plan or should it institute pure comparative fault?
The alternative of extending Wyoming's prior comparative negligence
statute4 to strict liability actions was discussed in some detail in the
original article.' 44 Even though the comparative negligence statute has
since been radically amended, 14 the prior statute will still apply for several
years. The new comparative negligence statute is applicable only to causes
of action which accrue after June 11, 1986.146 Because Wyoming's tort
statute of limitation is four years,'4 7 the prior comparative negligence
statute will govern pre-June 11, 1986 causes of action at least until June,
1990.
The simplest means of applying comparative principles to strict liability would be to follow Wisconsin's lead, deem strict liability to be negligence per se, and merely apply the comparative negligence statute in such
cases." 8 Since the 1973 statute was taken from Wisconsin,' 9 that result
may be pre-ordained for causes of action to which that statute applies
by the rule which requires the adopting state (Wyoming) to also adopt
the judicial construction of the parent state (Wisconsin) at the time of
adoption. 50
Wyoming's new comparative statute' 5' is unique to Wyoming. While
a compelling argument can be made that the statute was intended to apply
to all causes of action for personal injury or death,'5 the fact remains that
142. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
143. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
144. Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 657-59.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 83-106.
146. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24, §§ 3, 4.
147. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105(a(iv}(C) (1977). The statute applies to strict liability claims.
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 345 (Wyo. 1986).
148. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967).
149. Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1977).
150. Id at 845; see Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 658-59.
151. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 83-101.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/14

22

Rochelle: Comparative Negligence and Srict Tort Liability - The Marriage Re
1987

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT TORT LIABILITY

477

by its terms it applies to "an action ... to recover damages for negligence .... "153Such a restriction has not prevented some courts from applying their state's comparative negligence statute to strict liability actions.'
Many courts, however, while refusing to apply their comparative negligence statutes to strict liability, have judicially legislated comparative
principles for application in such actions.'6 ' As Professor Schwartz points
out:
[It is within the power of the judiciary to decide what defenses
are appropriate in strict liability cases, and there is no reason why
comparative negligence should not be selected in the appropriate
situation.... [Slince the legislature has endorsed comparative
it as a principle of common
negligence, it is reasonable to apply
56
law where it would be helpful.
C. Modified or Pure Comparative Fault
Where a court determines to apply comparative fault in strict liability, but decides that the comparative negligence statute itself does not
apply, the question arises as to whether to adopt the same comparative
scheme as that of the statute. That is, if the comparative negligence
statute is of the modified form, such as that of Wyoming, should the
judicial "legislation" for strict liability also be modified? The authors consider it unfortunate that most courts which have considered this question have adopted a pure comparative scheme for strict liability even
though their comparative negligence statutes are modified. Only the New
Hampshire Supreme Court seems to have followed that state's modified
comparative negligence statute, saying: "We judicially recognize the comparative concept in strict liability cases parallel to the legislature's recognition of it in the area of negligence.' 5
Texas and Utah are typical of those states whose comparative
negligence statutes are modified but whose courts have opted to adopt
pure comparative principles for strict liability. Rejecting comparative
"fault" as a misnomer, Texas has chosen to call its plan for strict liability "comparative causation."'' 8 Despite Texas' modified comparative neg153. WYo.

STAT. ANN.

§ 1-1-109(a) (Supp. 1986).

154. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
156. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 12.2, at 197.
157. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843, 850 (1978). Since
Thibault New Hampshire has adopted a comparative fault statute. See supra note 38. In
actuality there are not many states which need to consider the question. While there are
twenty states having modified comparative negligence statutes, only seven-Delaware,
Hawaii, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Vermont and Wyoming-need to consider whether to
adopt pure or modified comparative principles for strict liability in the face of a modified
comparative negligence statute. This is because the question of what scheme to apply to
strict liability in other states is answered by a separate statute on strict liability (four states);
by applying their comparative negligence statue to strict liability (four states); or by rejecting the concept of applying comparative principles to strict liability at all (five states). See
infra Appendix (Table of States).
158. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex. 1984).
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ligence statute,' 9 the Texas Supreme Court held "that in products liability
cases in which at least one defendant is found liable on a theory other
than negligence, the plaintiff's damages shall be reduced only by the
percentage of causation attributed to the plaintiff, regardless of how large
or small that percentage may be."1 0
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has held, "In contrast to the
statutory limitation governing the application of comparative principles
in the case of negligence and contributory negligence, the rule we adopt
for strict liability will not altogether bar recovery where plaintiff's relative
fault and causation exceeds that of defendant." ''
Other states which have considered the question and have opted for
pure comparison despite a modified statute are Hawaii, North Dakota and,
arguably, Wyoming." 2
In Sheldon, 63 with virtually no analysis of whether to apply Wyoming's modified comparative negligence statute, ala Wisconsin, or whether
to apply it in principle, ala New Hampshire, the Tenth Circuit adopted
pure comparative fault. In so doing it granted the plaintiff judgment for
$324,000 despite the fact that the jury found him ten percent more
negligent than either of the other actors."' It is the authors' opinion that
so long as Wyoming has a modified comparative negligence statute1 6 5 any
judicial adoption of comparative principles for strict liability should match
the terms of the statute. Compare two cases, building upon the hypothetical facts set forth
in Ogle, used there in support of the court's adoption
1 66
of strict liability:
Case No. 1 An automobile manufacturer makes spindle nuts.
(A spindle nut holds the entire wheel and bearing assembly onto
the axle). Despite the exercise of due care, one of the millions of
spindle nuts is defective. The plaintiff, in whose vehicle the defective nut was installed, notices that he has a wobbly wheel, which
he calls to the attention of his garage mechanic. The mechanic tells
159. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REm. CODE ANN. §§ 32.001 to .003, 33.001 to .017 (Vernon 1986)
(formerly TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 7, §§ 2212, 2212a (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1987)).
160. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429.

161. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Utah 1981). Since Mulherin,
Utah has adopted a new modified comparative statute which applies to strict liability. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
162. See infra Appendix (Table of States).
163. 797 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1300 (1987). Sheldon was a
breach of warranty, not a strict liability, case. See supra text accompanying notes 118-126
(Section I.B.).
164. Sheldon, 797 F.2d at 885, 887-88. The other "actors" were the defendant Unit Rig

and the plaintiff's employer, Federal American Partners. Federal American Partners was
immune from liability to the plaintiff because of Wyoming's workers' compensation law,
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-12-103 (1977). It is interesting to note that had Wyoming's new comparative negligence act been in effect and had the decision been based on negligence, see
supra text accompanying notes 82-104, the plaintiff in Sheldon could recover from Unit Rig,
thirty percent of the jury's verdict of $540,000, or $162,000.
165. Which it does under either the pre-1986 version or the new act. See supra text accompanying notes 83-106.

166. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986).
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him it will take a few days to get the parts and, in the meantime,
it would be best not to drive the car because the wheel might fall
off. But, since the plaintiff has been driving the car for several
weeks with the wobbly wheel and nothing has happened, he drives
the car anyway. The wheel does come off and the plaintiff is injured. He sues the automobile manufacturer in strict liability. Pursuant to Section 402A, the plaintiff need only prove that the product was defective and that the defect caused his injuries. Due
16 7
care of the manufacturer is immaterial. The jury finds the product defective, returns a verdict of $100,000, but assigns 45% of
the fault or "cause" or "responsibility" to the manufacturer's
defective product and 55% to the plaintiff. Under the pure comparative rule in Sheldon,1 6 8 the plaintiff could recover $45,000
despite being 55% at fault.
Case No. 2. In this hypothetical there is no defective product.
Instead, an improperly trained garage mechanic, drunk at the
time, negligently installs a spindle nut on the plaintiff's car. The
plaintiff notices a wheel wobble, takes it back to the garage and
is told that it will take a few days to get new parts and, in the
meantime, it would be best not to drive the car because the wheel
might fall off. But, since the plaintiff has been driving the car for
several days with the wobbly wheel and nothing has happened,
he drives the car anyway. The wheel does come off and the plaintiff is injured. The plaintiff sues the garage in negligence. The jury
returns a verdict of $100,000 but assigns 45% of the fault to the
garage and 55% to the plaintiff. Under Wyoming's modified comstatute, the plaintiff would be precluded from
parative negligence
69
any recovery.
Why the difference in the result? Why, indeed, especially in view of
the fact that the garage and its mechanic were guilty of blameworthy
the manufacturer is liable despite its exconduct-of negligence-while
17 0
ercise of due care.
The above examples are simplistic factual situations. In real life, litigation is seldom as clear cut. A more likely scenario would involve the allegedly negligent plaintiff against the allegedly negligent garage and the
allegedly negligent and strictly liable manufacturer, cross-claims among
167.

RESTATEMENT § 402A(2)(a).

168. Sheldon, 797 F.2d at 887.
169. Under old section 1-1-109, there was no recovery if the plaintiff's negligence was
equal to or greater than that of any party against whom recovery was sought. Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977); see Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174 (Wyo.), reh'g
denied, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981). Under new section 1-1-109(a), there is no recovery if the
plaintiff's negligence was greater than fifty percent of the total fault. WYo. STAT. ANN. §
1-1-109(a) (Supp. 1986).
170. This argument is certainly not intended as a criticism of strict products liability,
as such. The authors applaud its long awaited adoption by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
The hypothetical cases are, however, intended to be a criticism of the inconsistencies and
contradictions inherent in having a modified plan for negligence and a pure scheme for strict
liability.
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the defendants and a third-party indemnity claim by the manufacturer
against the supplier of the spindle nuts based on negligence, breach of
warranty and strict liability. In this far more true-to-life hypothetical there
is not only the inconsistency and contradiction noted above, there is the
nightmare of instructing the jury as to the law and as to "the consequences
of its determination of the percentage of negligence" 17' or "fault' ' 17 and
"of the consequences of its verdict."'7 Thus, the authors urge
the adoption of consistent rules which would apply to both negligence and strict
liability. Should any court considering this issue find it inappropriate to
apply Wyoming's comparative negligence statute to strict liability, but
find it appropriate to adopt comparative principles anyway, the New
Hampshire approach is recommended. A modified comparative plan for
negligence is, after all, the established public policy of this state. There
is no cogent reason why a modified plan should not also be applied to strict
liability. '14
D. Conduct to be Compared
In a comparative negligence case, all causative, substandard conduct
of all actors will be considered by the jury in assessing each actor's relative
percentage of fault.' 7' In a number of jurisdictions, however, in strict liability litigation, some causative negligent conduct of the plaintiff is ignored.
As is shown by the Table of States appended to this article, 21 of the 34
states applying comparative principles in strict liability permit comparison
of all conduct of the plaintiff, 11 permit comparison of only certain types
of conduct, one (Ohio) has conflicting intermediate court decisions and
one (Vermont) has yet to decide the issue.
Despite its shortcomings, the Sheldon decision 7 6 was correct in two
key respects. First, it properly determined that comparative principles
should be applied in a products case (albeit breach of warranty). Second,
it properly accepted the jury's findings as to the percentage of negligence
of the plaintiff, reducing his recovery accordingly. The "quality" of that
negligence was not questioned, it was simply applied.177
171. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
172. Id § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B) (Supp. 1986).
173. Id § 1-1-114 (1977).
174. Some of the courts which have adopted pure comparative fault for strict liability
in the face of a modified comparative negligence statute have done so on the basis that pure
comparative negligence advances the purposes of strict liability. See, e.g., Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 429 (Tex. 1984); see also supra text accompanying note 158
(quoting from Duncan).
The issue of pure versus modified comparison, however, was never an issue in and is
not a part of § 402A or its comments. The motivating factor behind adoption of strict liability was to avoid the sometimes impossible burden of proving the product seller's lack of
due care. See Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986). This basic tenet
is unaffected by the application of comparative principles, be they pure or modified. See
Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 665-67.
175. See, e.g., ComparativeNegligence-Theory and Effect, WYo. CiV. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 10.01, 10.03 (1981).
176. 797 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1300 (1987); see supra notes
118-126 and accompanying text (section IV.B.).
177. Sheldon, 797 F.2d 883. Nor was the issue discussed.
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Those states which would ignore certain causally negligent conduct
of the plaintiff primarily rely on comments (h) and (n) to section 402A of
the Restatement.' Comment (h) addresses "abnormal handling" and
states that where the product is safe for normal handling and the injury
results from abnormal handling, "the seller is not liable."I" Comment (n),
entitled "Contributory negligence," states that negligence of the plaintiff which is merely "a failure to discover the defect in the product, or
to guard against the possibility of its existence" is not a defense. However,
the comment continues, if the plaintiff's conduct amounts to an assumption of risk, "he is barred from recovery."'' 10 It is apparent that if either
defense exists, it is, by the terms of the comments, absolute. There is no
comparison, no proportionate reduction-the plaintiff loses.
After the advent of comparative negligence"" and the early efforts
to apply that concept to strict liability, it became apparent that the
Restatement comments and comparative principles were incompatible.
There were two responses by the courts: first, to disregard the comments
as the product of an earlier, now irrelevant, (contributory negligence) era
or, second, to continue recognition of the comments but to apply them
on a comparative basis. Those courts choosing the second alternative fall
generally into two categories: (1) those which will permit comparison of
any conduct of the plaintiff except a failure to discover a defect or guard
against its existence 2 and (2) those which permit no comparison except
conduct which amounts to assumption of risk." 3 The majority of courts
which have considered the issue, however, have elected to submit to the
fact finder all conduct of all parties, without restriction. The following
language from the seminal case of Daly v. General Motors Corp."84 exemplifies this determination:
Those same underlying considerations of policy which moved us
judicially in [negligence cases] to rescue blameworthy plaintiffs
from a 100-year-old sanction against all recovery persuade us now
to extend similar principles to the strict products liability area.
Legal responsibility is thereby shared. We think that apportioning tort liability is sound, logical and capable of wider application
than to negligence cases alone.. . . We reiterate that our reason
for extending a full system of comparative fault to strict products
liability is because it is fair to do so.' 85
Author, now Judge, Woods states:
The attractiveness of comparative fault is its simplicity. It profits from the obvious drawback to comment (n) [of section 402A
178. RESTATEMENT § 402A.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. § 402A, comment h. This is the "misuse" defense.
Id § 402A, comment n.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976).
See, e.g., Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 (Alaska 1985).
20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
Id at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (emphasis in original.
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of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] that it is difficult to
distinguish between "failure to discover the defect or guard
against the possibility of its existence" and "lack of ordinary
care"; between "assumption of risk" and "contributory negligence"; and between "contributory negligence" and "foreseeable
or unforeseeable misuse."186
It should also be noted that the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
provides:
In an action based on fault to recover damages for injury or death
to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable
to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded
as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault ....,
"Fault" is then defined to include negligence, strict liability, breach of
warranty, assumption of risk and product misuse."' 8
Professor Schwartz says:
It is, at best, extremely difficult to justify the distinction made
in contributory negligence states between, on the one hand, assumption of risk as an absolute defense to strict liability, and, on
the other hand, ordinary contributory negligence as no defense.
This troublesome dichotomy need not and should not be retained
under comparative negligence. 8 9
In our original article, we concluded:
To limit defenses to misuse and assumption of risk is an unwise
concession to Restatement comments which were made obsolete
by the spread of comparative responsibility. Such an approach
satisfies neither the purposes of comparative fault nor the precepts
of the Restatement, and thus does an injustice to both.
Despite the attempt of some courts to reconcile the limited
strict liability defenses of the Restatement comments with the concept of comparative fault, the two are simply not comparable. To
avoid confusion and injustice in products liability law, what must
give way are the notions that a plaintiff may recover without
regard to his causative negligence or that a defendant seller may
be free of liability despite his injury-producing product. The concept which must prosper is that blameworthy actors must be
responsible for damage caused by their conduct or their defective
products.190
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Woods, The Trend Toward ComparativeFault 20 TRIAL 16 (1984).
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(a), 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
Id § l(b).
V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 214-15.
Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 6, at 664 (italics added).
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The developments in the law since the original article Was published,
while still to some extent conflicting, reinforce the validity of these
arguments.
VI. CONCLUSION
At long last, Wyoming has adopted the doctrine of strict products
liability. But the question of how and to what extent a plaintiff's negligent
conduct will affect his recovery remains basically unanswered. The alternatives are many, ranging from applying misuse and assumption of risk
as absolute defenses, to adopting an unqualified comparative fault plan;
from denying recovery if the plaintiff's share of the fault is more than
half of the total, to compensating him to some degree regardless of his
share of the fault; from applying, directly or by analogy, Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, to forging a different plan specifically for this
new tort.
Adoption of some form of comparative fault for strict products liability
is considered a certainty. To avoid confusion and complexity, and to provide fairness and equity, a plan which parallels Wyoming's statutory
scheme for negligence is considered a necessity.
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APPENDIX: TABLE OF STATES

State

Alabama
n.76
Alaska
n.45
Arizona
n.26
Arkansas
n.32
California
n.46
Colorado
n.19
Connecticut
n.20
Delaware
n.82
Florida
n.47
Georgia
n.64
Hawaii
n.48
Idaho
n.21
Illinois
n.27
Indiana
n.74
Iowa
n.28
Kansas
n.13
Kentucky
n.75
Louisiana
n.56
Maine
n.33
Maryland
n.77
Massachusetts
n.72
Michigan
n.22

Statutory
Scheme

Judicial
Action

Conduct
Compared

none

none

-

none

5p, 6 p

10

3p

-

10

2m

none

9

none

5p, 6p

9

1m, 4p

-

9

1m, 4p

-

9

lm

none

-

none

5p, 6p

10

lp

5p, 8

-

lm

6p

9

Im, 4m

-

9

3m

-

9

lm, 4

-

-

3m

-

9

Im

7m

9

4

5p, 8

-

lp

6p

10

2m

7m

10

none

none

-

Im

8

-

4p

5p

9
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State
Minnesota
n.23
Mississippi
n.37
Missouri
n.73
Montana
n.11
Nebraska
n.24
Nevada
n.53
New Hampshire
n.38
New Jersey
n.14
New Mexico
n.57
New York
n.34
No. Carolina
n.78
No. Dakota
n.58
Ohio
n.59
Oklahoma
n.65
Oregon
n.35
Pennsylvania
n.66
Rhode Island
n.41
South Carolina
n.79
South Dakota
n.67
Tennessee
n.80
Texas
n.49
Utah
n.29
Vermont
n.60

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Statutory
Scheme

Judicial
Action

3m

Vol. XXII
Conduct
Compared
9

2p

7p

9

none

5p, 8

-

1m

7m

10

3m

-

9

1m

8

-

3m

-

9

1m

7m

10

none

5p, 6p

9

2p

none

9

none

none

-

1m

6p

10

Im

6

p?

?

lm

8

-

2m

7m

1m

8

-

2p

7m

9

none

none

-

1m

8

none

none

-

Im

6p

10

3m
Im

10

9
6p?
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State

Virginia
n.81
Washington
n.25
West Virginia
n.61
Wisconsin
n.15
Wyoming
nn.1, 83-95,
107-126

Statutory
Scheme

Judicial
Action

Conduct
Compared

none

none

-

3p

-

9

none

5m, 6m

10

Im

7m

9

1m, 2m?

6p

9

Key:
The n. following each state name is to the footnote(s) in this article
referring to that state.
The letter "m" following a numeral indicates a modified comparative
plan.
The letter "p" following a numeral indicates a pure comparative plan.
A "?" indicates the issue is unresolved.
1 = Comparative Negligence Statute
2 = Undefined Comparative Statute
3 = Comparative Statute Includes Both Negligence and Strict
Liability
4 = Separate Product Liability Statute (If not followed by either a
letter "In" or "p", the statute rejects comparative application of defenses)
5 = Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence
6 = Judicial Adoption of Comparative Principles for Strict Liability
7 = Judicial Extension of Comparative Negligence or Undefined
Statute to Strict Liability
8 = Judicial Rejection of Comparative Principles for Strict Liability
9 = All Conduct is Compared
10 = Less Than All Conduct is Compared
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